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This article attempts to reflect on the success of attempts by academic 
research to understand and explain the sentencing decision process. It iden- 
tifies conventional themes in the conception and representation of that 
decision process and argues that there are some important difficulties 
associated with them and consequently implications for both the findings of 
sentencing research and for approaches to sentencing reform. The article 
suggests a possible alternative approach to conceptualizing and representing 
the sentencing decision process and also raises questions about the nature 
of the discretionary (legal) decision process more generally. 
I will argue that a predominant tradition in sentencing research is based 
on a ‘legal-analytical’ paradigm which posits legal categories as the starting 
point for interpreting sentencing and then attempts to ‘add in’ supposedly 
discrete pieces of information about a case as if they were independent 
‘factors’. An alternative approach, offered by this article, begins from the 
recognition that the criminal process constructs and reconstructs cases for 
the purpose of sentencing as ‘typical whole case stories’. Although the 
implications for sentencing reform, (for example, ‘Guidelines’) and the role 
of philosophical justifications of punishment will be discussed, it is not the 
primary aim of this article to suggest either how sentencing ought to be reformed 
(or not); nor, to describe how sentencing research should operationalize an 
approach based on ‘typical whole case stories’. Rather, my purpose here is 
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to suggest that there may be a gap between how sentencing decisions are 
processed in practice and the conceptual starting points which research has 
employed to interpret that practice. 
Internationally, over the last twenty-five years there has been a very 
substantial body of attempts to try to reform sentencing practise. However, 
in practice the successful implementation of reform has been notoriously 
difficult to achieve. If we are to try to make sense of this experience then 
perhaps we should re-examine some of the predominant assumptions about 
the sentencing decision process. 
THE SEARCH FOR ‘EXPLANATIONS’ 
Sentencing is frequently seen as one of the clearest examples of an area where 
decision-makers enjoy very wide discretion.’ Yet, despite the interest which 
it has received from both academic and journalistic investigators, a number 
of commentators have noted that we actually possess fairly little under- 
standing of the nature of the sentencing decision process. For example, Lacey 
observes that: 
[tlraditionally criminal lawyers have shown little interest in this highly discretionary area, 
but over the last fifteen years, reporting of sentencing cases and renewed academic interest 
in Britain (to take an example) has revealed the extent of judicial and magisterial 
discretion and of disparity in its exercise among different judges and magistrates . . . 
m h e  main focus of the debate has been on disparity . . . concerning what happens rather 
than why this is the case . . .2 
Similarly, Rumgay notes that, ‘the explanation for discrepancies within indi- 
vidual courts in their treatment of like cases remains e l~s ive . ’~  
However, both of these statements seem to imply that it is possible to 
divorce a straightforward description of sentencing (what Lacey calls ‘what 
happens’) from its explanation (‘why this is the case’). Rather, I would 
suggest that questions of ‘description’ and ‘explanation’ are rather more inti- 
mately connected. The attempt to describe and measure ‘disparity’ necessi- 
tates some attempt to explain it through some kind of image of ‘similarity’ 
between the object of the decision : ‘cases’. 
I shall suggest that our ability to understand and ‘explain’ (and therefore to 
‘describe’) the sentencing process has been limited by a particular set of 
assumptions about ‘similarity’ between cases which have produced a limited 
conception and representation of the sentencing decision process. I shall suggest 
an alternative way of conceptualizing and representing the sentencing p r~cess .~  
SENTENCING AS A COMPARATIVE PROCESS 
I would like to begin by emphasizing that the act of sentencing is funda- 
mentally a comparative process. 
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It is, of course, an axiom of judicial rhetoric on sentencing that every case 
is unique and as such each case must be judged on its own facts.s Further, 
it is argued that because each case is unique it is therefore not possible to 
compare one case with another. However, the untenability of this claim was 
exposed by Hood writing nearly twenty-five years ago: 
. . . magistrates and judges frequently turn to precedent for their ruling and place particular 
value on their experience in sentencing. Now, if this experience is to be of value, then all 
cases cannot be unique, they must be comparable at least in some respects; and even if 
it is agreed that all cases are unique in some sense, this cannot be decisive in the practice 
of sentencing, for frequently decisions are reached with the aid of ‘experience’! 
Similarly, Wilkins observes that: 
[n]o unique or once and for all event can be any guide . . . We can only use information 
as a guide when we are prepared to consider similarities, not when we are emphasizing 
differences (uniqueness) to the exclusion of all other  consideration^.^ 
To recognize ‘difference’ we must also recognize ‘similarity’: the two are 
different sides of the same coin. Since necessarily it must be possible, at least 
in principle, to compare cases and thus to investigate judicial conceptions 
of ‘similarity’, how can and should this ‘similarity’ be understood? 
THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND AND 
REPRESENT ‘SIMILARITY’ 
Official statistics* and a number of academic studies have attempted to 
employ the notion of ‘case ~imilarity’~ by comparing the sentencing decisions 
of courts according to the same criminal law convictions (for example, ‘theft’, 
‘robbery’, ‘assault’, or convictions under a particular section of an Act of 
Parliament) or aggregations which are based on official criminal law convic- 
tions. According to this approach, it is then possible to compare meaning- 
fully the sentences passed according to the same official, legal headline 
convictions. It might then safely be concluded that any variation in sentenc- 
ing found is not due to any systematic variation in the similarity of the 
offences for which the offenders had been sentenced. For example, Patchett 
and Mclean assumed that courts in their sample dealt with similar types of 
offenders.I0 Green controlled for intake by prediction methods.” Hood 
controlled for offence similarity by restricting his study to property offenders 
aged twenty-one and over.IZ Tarling compared the sentencing of seventy 
magistrates’ courts by controlling for three variables: type of offence 
(officially defined), age of the offender, and whether or not s/he.had any 
previous convictions.~3 Citing earlier research, Tarling argues that although 
further information about the offence and offender were not available, this 
‘may not be a serious omission.’I4 Intriguingly, however, Tarling later reports 
how discussions with justices and clerks showed that ‘ . . . in general it was 
thought that differences in the sorts of crimes dealt with by different courts 
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precluded any useful comparisons between their sentencing policies.’ls 
However, for two reasons, this is not necessarily a safe conclusion to draw. 
First, sentencers consider the circumstances of the events surrounding the 
commission of a legal offence. Previous research, shows that sentencing is 
determined by far more than the legal definition of the offence(s).16 The 
‘headline’ offence(s) (for example, ‘robbery’, ‘rape’, ‘theft’, and so on) with 
which an offender is charged and convicted may be of limited relevance in 
deciding sentence. 
Reliance on the official ‘headline’ conviction may be unsafe for a second 
reason. Even though in their samples, researchers may attempt to control 
case similarity in terms of the headline conviction, the nature (and serious- 
ness) of cases coming before different sentencers may vary systematically. It 
is quite possible, even likely, that different courts, or even different sentencers 
in the same court, will be required to sentence caseloads whose seriousness 
varies systematically. Even though different headline convictions may be the 
same, it is likely that this legal similarity may mask an underlying and system- 
atic variation in seriousness. So the caseload of different courts ‘robberies’ 
or ‘thefts’ or ‘assaults’ or ‘section 112s’ may vary markedly in seriousness. 
Differing approaches to prosecution may vary between prosecution offices, 
possible variation in judicial practices in the deferment of sentence” and the 
administration of the courts and the process of information flows’* may all 
act singly or in combination to present different sentencers with systematically 
distinct caseloads in terms of their relative seriousness. 
1. The conception and representation of similarity needs to be organized 
from the perspective of sentencing 
As we saw above, research investigating sentencing disparity has often 
portrayed the sentencing process as simply using official legal taxonomy as 
its sole or main starting point. On the basis of more recent research with 
judges,I9 I would suggest that we need to think more imaginatively about 
our representations of similarity from the perspective of sentencing. This 
may mean that the representation of similarity will not necessarily reflect 
the content and structure of the criminal law. We need to represent 
sentencers’ interpretation of similarity from the perspective of sentencing 
rather than from the perspective of a taxonomy of legal convictions which 
would involve a slavish repetition of official criminal law classifications.20 
This may mean a fuller ‘description’ and ‘explanation’ of sentencing. 
2 Similarity of cases sentenced where there is more than one conviction 
In trying to represent sentencers’ understandings of similarity, one question 
seems to have been neglected.21 How can the similarity and seriousness of 
cases be captured where sentences are passed for cases where there is more 
than one conviction? 
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It  appears to be common practice in jurisdictions around the world to 
prosecute a person in court for more than one charge at  one time. The prob- 
lem lies in the fact that one ‘case’22 may be sentenced for a number of convic- 
tions. How should this case be recorded and represented by researchers? 
There appear to be a number of possible options. 
(a) A ‘multi-sentence’ approach? 
It might be supposed that each individual conviction within a case should 
be recorded against each individual corresponding sentence within a case. 
However, such a multi-sentence approach depends upon two presumptions. 
The first presumption is that all convictions within a case are sentenced 
separately by judges. While this does happen, many sentences passed in 
Scotland (for example) are separate convictions which are passed in conjunc- 
tion with each other: ‘in curnulo’, ‘concurrently’ or indeed ‘consecutively’, 
or, any combination of these. The second presumption would be that 
sentences passed separately (‘consecutively’) do  not influence each other in 
practice. Even in those cases where sentences are formally passed separately, 
it is almost inevitable that, in practice, the consecutive sentences do  in fact 
influence each other. Sentencers tend to view one offender convicted of more 
than one conviction on one ‘indictment’ or ‘complaint’ as a whole case rather 
than as merely separate legal convictions abstracted from each other.23 
How, then, should sentences for cases with more than one conviction 
be recorded? What is needed is a way of recording information about 
sentences for offences which more closely reflects the way in which judges 
think about sentencing. 
(b) A ‘principal sentence’ approach 
An approach to recording and representing information about sentencing 
practice based on ‘the principal sentence’ can be found in representations 
provided by the recording schemes of official statistics. These record the 
sentence against a principal ‘headline’ conviction (regardless of the circum- 
stances of the commission of the offence). The main conviction, however, 
is defined by the conviction which is judged to have received the most 
‘punitive’ sentence. Often, the ‘headline’ conviction which receives the most 
severe sentence will be regarded by sentencers as the most serious convic- 
ti0n.2~ However, the seriousness of a headline conviction is by no means the 
only determinant of sentence. Rather, to regard the conviction which receives 
the most punitive sentence as necessarily the most serious conviction is to 
offer only an indirect account of the principal (or most serious) conviction. 
In addition to the circumstances of the commission offence, other circum- 
stances, such as the previous record of the offender, (not to mention the 
awareness of parole eligibility), can be important determinants of a more or 
less severe sentence for one offence than another even if the offence with 
the lesser sentence is otherwise more serious. Therefore, in view of its ability 
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to provide at best only a probable indication of the principal offence, this 
approach would be better described and recognized as a ‘principal sentence’ 
approach rather than a ‘principal offence’ approach. It does not directly 
record or represent the most serious offence, but rather the most severe 
penalty which may or may not coincide. 
(c) A ‘principal offence’ approach? 
What is described here as the ‘principal offence’ approach has tended to be 
the most common way that sentencing researchers have recorded the 
sentence passed for cases where there is more than one c o n v i c t i ~ n . ~ ~  This
approach may be based on strict legal conviction taxonomy,26 or attempt to 
develop some more generic representations of offence  incident^.^^ However, 
the rationale for this approach is that judges often feel that one conviction 
is clearly the more or most serious in a case. For example, it may be felt by 
sentencers that some charges are libelled on an indictment for evidential 
reasons and as such held weight for the purposes of securing conviction on 
a main charge rather than for the purpose of considering sentence. It is often 
felt that there is often one principal offence for which sentence was really 
passed. Additional convictions may be considered to be incidental or of 
much lesser seriousness. They are often regarded as essentially ‘factors’ 
which may modify the relative seriousness of the principal conviction.28 
Although the principal offence approach has been employed in various 
contexts, I would argue that it is subject to important limitations. 
Consider a typical kind of case before the Scottish High Court. A man is 
convicted of three charges libelled on an indictment. Two of these convic- 
tions are for sodomy against two boys and one is for rape against a girl. 
Which is the principal offence? It is not immediately apparent. The principal 
offence approach requires that one offence is selected and recorded by the 
researcher as the most serious and further factors may be included as charac- 
teristics of that principal offence, such as number of victims of the principal 
offence; number of offences of the principal offence, and so on. This approach 
to recording and representing information about sentencing means that the 
output of such research artificially privileges one conviction over another. 
Rather than regarding it as merely two convictions of sodomy and one 
of rape, judges considering sentence tend to view the case as a whole: a case 
of a father sexually abusing his children systematically over a long course 
of time; a case of ‘aggravated child abuse’. This may be seen by the judge 
as similar to other sexual abuse cases aggravated by the course of conduct 
and/or nature of the offences. In the attempt to represent similarity, the 
principal conviction approach can miss potentially similar cases. Therefore, 
some broad distinctions need to be made between relatively ‘ordinary’ child 
sexual abuse and the more serious, aggravated type of case. 
Let us take another example: eight convictions of ‘theft’ of items of a simi- 
larly low value from eight different shops during one day. Using a principal 
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offence approach, one of the thefts would have to be privileged as ‘the main 
offence’. To do so would fail to capture the relative seriousness of the offence- 
incident compared with cases where, in similar circumstances, there was only 
one of two convictions. Sentencers have reported seeing the former as a kind 
of ‘professional shop-lifting’ as opposed to a more amateurish ~ar ie ty .2~ 
3. An approach based on ‘typical whole offence stories’ 
I would suggest that one way to resolve the intractable problem of represent- 
ing similarity in multi-conviction cases is to try to develop a series of different 
types of offence stories which would reflect the way in which sentencers 
think about offence information as a whole. 
In considering sentence, judges do not think about each conviction in a 
multi-charge indictment in isolation from each other and from the circum- 
stances of the commission of the offences. Rather, they tend to view the case 
as a whole offending incident or narrative of criminal events, or ‘typical 
whole offence stories’.30 In attempting to understand (both ‘describe’ and 
‘explain’) the process of the decision-making of sentencers, empirical 
research with judges has used sentencing vignettes rather than necessarily 
relying on criminal law classifications which are necessarily limited in the 
relevant information which they can offer the sentencer.j’ A very limited 
attempt to realize this approach has been adopted by a project to design 
and implement a sentencing information system for the Scottish High 
Court.32 Therefore, it is necessary to depart from the classifications of the 
criminal law in order to reflect more closely the way that judges think about 
sentencing different types of offence stories. 
(a) A typology of offence stories from the perspective of sentencing 
Types of whole offence stories may be broadly distinguished in terms of 
their relative seriousness. A simple example relates to several driving convic- 
tions under the Road Traffic (Scotland) Act 1988. Typically, an offender 
may be convicted of three offences under this Act involving ‘taking a vehicle 
without the owner’s consent’ (s. 143), driving without insurance (s. 178), 
driving without due care and attention (s. 2). Rather than having to choose 
a notional principal offence, sentencers conceive of this as part of a typical 
whole offence narrative or story which might be reflected by the term ‘joy- 
riding’. Similarly, terms such as ‘aggravated child abuse’ and ‘professional 
shop-lifting’, as discussed above, have been employed. I would suggest that 
sentencers approach the sentencing decision by thinking of an offence- 
incident, or series of related incidents (what lawyers might call a ‘course of 
conduct’) as ‘typical whole offence stories’. Yet, does an approach based on 
typical whole offence stories over-simplify and stereotype what is often said 
to be a highly complex decision process? 
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(b) Is an approach based on typical whole offence stories too crude? 
It may be objected that the attempt to produce a ‘holistic typology’ of 
offences33 for sentencing research is overly simple since the very idea of 
‘types’ of cases denies the delicate and subtle complexities of the ‘knowledge’ 
represented by the criminal law. However, to make such an argument is to 
lose sight of the fact that this ‘knowledge’ is created for a particular purpose: 
securing convictions and acquittals.” All legal convictions are themselves 
typologies. Indeed, research in other areas of the criminal process has shown 
the ways in which formal ‘discretion’ becomes patterned, and standardized 
and cases become ‘typical’. 
Shapland has noted the relative isolation of the sentencing decision and 
reliance on largely documentary sources.35 In common with prosecutors and 
parole board members, there are, she notes, ‘. . . few others in the criminal 
justice system who are in the position of having to take decisions largely on 
the basis of documentary sources - the “file”.’36 Far from popular images 
informed by lengthy, high-profile cases, the overwhelming mass of sentencing 
in the English-speaking world is conducted in the absence of a trial.37 
Sentencers have to take decisions almost entirely on the basis of the file 
which has been constructed, restructured, and altered (sometimes radically) 
at every point in the criminal process before sentencing. 
This is perhaps similar to the situation in which prosecutors find them- 
selves at an earlier stage in the criminal process. Baldwin’s study of ‘pre- 
trial settlement’ in magistrates’ courts observes the importance of ‘pre-trial 
revie~’.3~ From his participant observation research of police detective work, 
Waegel concludes that, ‘[a] great deal of actual detective work may . . . be 
seen as a process of mapping the features of a particular case onto a more 
general and commonly recognized type of case.’39 Moody and Tombs have 
shown that prosecutorial decision-making is largely determined by the previ- 
ous structure given to the case by the police, by notions of ‘normal’ crimes’,4o 
and by long established working practices.41 For example, in police reports, 
(which the Procurator Fiscal’s offices use to draft charges), generally: 
the report focuses on the offence itself and the ingredients deemed necessary for proving 
the offence. The language is stereotyped and the thrust of the presentation is towards 
minimising uncertainty . . .’* 
The charges themselves are drafted in a finite variety of ways which have 
the effect of standardizing and normalizing reports of relatively complex 
human behaviour: 
[I) is remembered that charges may be drafted in a standard way commonly referred 
to by fiscals as a style . . . [and it is a] . . . process of  assimilating prosecutorial norms 
and rendering the unfamiliar familiar . . .‘I 
In his study of the Scottish public prosecutor’s decision to divert persons 
away from prosecution to psychiatric care, Duff also emphasizes the way in 
which the prosecutor’s formal discretion is largely determined by the previ- 
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ous structure given to the case. He argues that the prosecutor’s decision is 
in practice largely determined by the routine cues and signals provided by 
the police report to the prosecutor’s office.” Sudnow reports research exam- 
ining the operation of the Public Defender system in the United States of 
America. In the course of routinely encountering persons charged with 
offences, the Public Defender (P.D.) learns to identify what Sudnow terms 
‘normal crimes’.45 These are: 
. . . those occurrences whose typical features, e.g., the way they usually occur and the 
characteristics of persons who commit them (as well as the typical victims and typical 
scenes), are known and attended to by the P.D.& 
Indeed, Sudnow observes the importance of this practical, working knowledge: 
Knowledge of the properties of offense types of offenders, i.e., their normal, typical, or 
familiar attributes, constitutes the mark of any given attorney’s competence. A major 
task in socializing the new P.D. deputy attorney consists in teaching him to recognize 
these attributes and to come to do so nat~rally.‘~ 
This process of familiarizing and normalizing cases continues when reports 
about the social and personal circumstances are made to the court. In an 
analysis of social enquiry reports in Scotland, Curran and Chambers note 
the constructed nature of the reports describing them as ‘persuasive docu- 
m e n t ~ ’ ~ ~  and Brown argues that the social enquiry report ‘ . . . presents a 
set of representations about the defendant which seeks to promote a partic- 
ular picture of that defendant for a particular Giller and Morris 
found that social workers use ‘operational philosophies’ (the means by which 
professional ideologies are mediated through the demands of practice):% 
Having located the moral character of the case, the social workers were able to respond 
with a repertoire of provisions which routinely met the case as portrayed. In this way, 
social work with offenders became ordered and rational and a work priority was 
established. Decisions were not ‘made’; they emerged as natural logical. even inevitable, 
responses to the social worker’s interpretation of the case. But these interpretations were 
part of a dialectic. What ‘explained’ the moral character of the case also provided 
evidence of its nature.s1 
This finding is confirmed by other research into problem-solving by other 
professionals, such as doctors who have to make diagnoses. Elstein et al. 
found that the doctors appeared to do a simpler job than they imagined, 
making use of simple conceptual schemata.52 While individual cases may be 
repeatedly normalized and typified, Emerson emphasizes that assessments 
about the seriousness of individual cases are not made in isolation from each 
other but, rather, within the organizational context of ‘streams of cases’ and 
that this, rather than the individual case, should be seen as the basic category 
for understanding ‘social control decision making’.53 
So, it is not that actual human behaviour (including that labelled ‘crim- 
inal’) which is necessarily typical or patterned, but that the accounts or 
‘stories’ of it presented to and interpreted by sentencers are patterned, 
normalized, and typified. Access to the social world is not direct or unmedi- 
ated: the criminal process necessarily must impose some narrative or inter- 
pretatative order upon it. 
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Much of the research discussed above draws on work into the use of 
discretion in the criminal process to try to illuminate the character of the 
discretionary decision process in sentencing. It may be argued, however, that 
the status of the sentencer is qualitatively different from others in the crim- 
inal process since s/he is the only one who has all the facts about the case. 
(i) The position of the sentencer in ‘being in possession of all the facts’ 
Although decision-makers in other parts of the criminal process develop 
informal patterns of representation of information, and behaviour, does the 
sentencing process function in a way distinct from that of other criminal 
decision processes? Does the attempt to produce ‘typical whole offence 
stories’ ignore the unique position of the judge in hearing the ‘all the facts’ 
of the case? I do not think so. Shapland,” Ashworth et al.,5s and Feeleys6 
suggest that what lawyers refer to as the ‘facts of the case’ should not 
properly be regarded as ‘facts’ but as: 
constructions of the circumstances forming the offence, stemming from the 
constructions made by the police (themselves very much negotiable and influenced by 
the individual views of detectives and the wishes of victims and witnesses) (Ericson 1981, 
Ericson 1982).J7 
Bearing in mind this ‘information throughput’ model, evidence gathered by 
the prosecution is refracted through the lens of a series of common law and 
statutory lenses. It can never be a notionally precise historical account of human 
behaviour, but must always be a pragmatically constructed representation of 
it.58 Nicholson notes that a minority of sentencers in her research sample 
disliked the use of the term ‘recommendations’ in social enquiry reports:59 
Their argument was that social enquiry report authors were not in possession of all the 
facts concerning any case were therefore not in a position to recommend sentences to 
the court.60 
The implication is that only the sentencer is in possession of all of the 
‘facts’. However, these are only objectively factual in a self-referential sense. 
The evidence before the sentencer cannot provide an objective factual 
account of human behaviour merely ‘constructed conventions’:6’ a prag- 
matic, purposive, and negotiated representation of a notional objective real- 
ity. The nature of criminal events and criminals may be infinitely unique but 
the nature of their legal representations are necessarily finite, typical, and 
exhaustible. The construction of criminal cases both before and during the 
judicial sentencing process are accounts which must satisfy particular require- 
ments which may in turn validate these accounts as ‘true’, or, ‘accurate’. 
If the character of the decision process in sentencing may not be qualita- 
tively distinct from that of other points in the criminal process because cases 
are typical constructed accounts rather than full or objective ‘facts’, then might 
the sentencing decision process be distinct in another sense? Is the process 
of the exercise of discretion within an adjudicative setting (sentencing) 
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fundamentally different from that within an administrative setting (for exam- 
ple, police, prosecution, social work decisions) as described above? 
(ii) Is the sentencing decision process different from the administrative 
I would suggest that the decision process may be not be very different in 
character, but that there are of course key activities of public justification 
which are more symbolically important in the adjudicative setting than in 
an administrative one. 
Judges frequently turn to the cumulative and evolved wisdom of judicial 
experience represented by precedent for their decisions and also place 
particular emphasis on their personal experience. This ‘experience’ may help 
judges in interpreting and schematizing the mass of information which helps 
to inform their decision. From his field experimental research into the 
psychology of decision-making of criminal sentencing, van Duyne found 
that despite the considerable discretion which it afforded, prosecutorial 
decision-making could be characterized as: 
decision process? 
. . . one dimensional: the Prosecutor selected out of the total information on the case 
only those aspects which were consistent with a particular ‘dimension’ (e.g. ‘professional’, 
‘social misfit’ or rehabilitation) and fitted these into simple conceptual schema [sic].62 
Although the prosecutor may make a few changes, the decision process 
remains basically the same. Van Duyne concludes that the results cast some 
doubt on the claim that: 
. . , sentencing is a highly complex process solely directed to ‘unique’ decisions in ‘unique’ 
cases. Without suggesting that the job of judges is just a matter of quick guesswork and 
routine, gilded with pomp and ceremony, I would like to state that judicial decision 
making is comparable to other kinds of open problem solving6) such as the grading of 
works of art by a viewing committee or the marking of an essay by a teacher. If sentencing 
is difficult, it is because of its uncertainty, not because of its complexity . . . In problem 
solving, [it is] necessary to restrict the information to one manageable dimension in order 
to avoid overload and uncertainty . . . There is no reason to assume that judges and pros- 
ecutors are a complex subdivision of the human race deserving a theory of their own. 
So I would suggest that in trying to conceptualize and represent offence 
similarity from the perspective of sentencing, it would be profitable for 
research to try think about typical whole case stories and rely less on the 
criminal law to inform our understandings of the sentencing process. One 
possibility might be to try to develop what has elsewhere been called ‘a 
schematic-holistic approach’64 which has been developed with judges to 
design and implement a Scottish sentencing information system.6s Essentially 
this groups offence information about cases together on the basis of a 
number of typically shared characteristics. As an approach which is specif- 
ically designed for the purpose of representing knowledge about sentencing 
from the exclusive perspective of sentencing, it produces a more sensitive 
taxonomic tool than that designed by the criminal law. However, such an 
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approach could be developed much further. It may be possible to develop 
typical whole case stories from the perspective of the task of sentencing and 
thereby avoid the difficulties which I shall argue are associated with the 
notions of ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’ and an ‘offence/offender’ 
dichotomy. First I shall discuss ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’ as a 
category of conception and representation of the sentencing decision process. 
4. ‘Aggravating and mitigating factors’ and the analytical approach 
The notion and language of aggravating and mitigating ‘factors’ is embedded 
in reason-giving accounts of decisions by sentencers, popular media and 
legal analysis. However, the notion may in fact obfuscate the sentencing 
decision process by presenting it as an artificially analytical process. 
Ashworth et al. discuss the interpretative nature of assigning information 
as having the status of being a ‘factor’.” Criminal law and sentencing texts 
list what they have distilled as being ‘factors’ which aggravate and mitigate 
Research has employed the idea of case information which can 
be extracted and analysed to discern the relative explanatory power of indi- 
vidual ‘pieces’ of information.68 Conforming with the image of justice weigh- 
ing each ‘factor’, there seems to be an assumption that sentencing is derived 
from a consideration of the legal conviction followed by a duellist process 
of aggravation and mi t iga t i~n .~~  I would argue that the reality is better 
represented by the idea of basic types of whole narratives or stories.70 
There does not seem to be agreement about information which ‘aggra- 
vates’ and which ‘mitigates’ sentence. Shapland found as many as 229 ‘miti- 
gating factors’.71 Some of these were seen as aggravating in other cases (for 
example, drunkenness). ‘It is even possible for opposite traits to be used in 
the same case to portray two totally different “deserving” types of people.’72 
Take the example of the employment position of an offender about to be 
sentenced. The same information may both aggravate the seriousness of one 
case and mitigate the seriousness of another. Being able to retain a job might 
mitigate against a custodial sentence, or, being jobless might evoke greater 
sympathy for an offender’s personal predicament. The same information 
may be aggravating and mitigating in the same case. Similarly, Tonry 
observes that ‘[mlany other regularly recurring circumstances are situation- 
ally relevant to sentencing but not universally relevant’.’j This illustrates the 
essentially interpretative and case-contextual nature of ‘aggravating’ and 
‘mitigating’ factors. The meaning of seriousness is fluid and relative to (and 
only meaningful within) the context of its typical whole offence story. 
Judges stress their treatment of cases as a ‘whole’ and the ‘feel’ for individ- 
ual cases. There has been judicial resistand4 to the attempt to represent 
sentencing according to some mathematical model associated with the 
addition and subtraction of ‘independent’ ‘factor~’.~S I would suggest that 
this resistance should not (with the benefit of hindsight) be entirely surprising. 
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Such an attempt to model the sentencing decision is to misrepresent 
decision-making as a deductive, linear, analytical, and mechanical activity. 
Rather, routine decision-making which is strongly characterized by formal 
discretion can be better understood as a process of gradual affirmation or 
denial of a provisional solution to a problem by informally employing typical 
or typical whole case stories built up through comparative experience. 
Weigend notes the inadequacy of ‘Aggravating and Mitigating Factors’ 
in explaining sentencing: 
The isolation of the aggravating and mitigating factors that influence a court . . . does 
not enable one accurately to predict sentencing decisions. What is missing is the point 
of departure: what is the ‘normal’ sentence for the ‘normal’ case of larceny, drunken 
driving, fraud, or assault? . . . Mathematical models suggested by some German writers 
. . . have failed to rationalize the sentencing process because it is impossible to draw 
reliable conclusions from the aggregate of largely irrational and unquantifiable factors.76 
However, he appears to attribute that failure to the ‘unreasonableness’ of 
sentencers rather than the failure of reliance on such a mathematical, 
analytical model: ‘When reason fails tradition steps in.’77 The implication 
here seems to be that because sentencing decisions cannot be ‘predicted’ 
adequately through the use of an analytical, mathematical model, the expla- 
nation for this inadequacy must lie in the replacement of ‘reason’ by ‘tradi- 
tion’ in sentencing. Rather, might one just as easily conclude that the 
inability to predict sentencing decisions from one perspective (the analytical, 
mathematical one) should lead us to re-evaluate the adequacy of that analyt- 
ical approach and contemplate the possibility of alternative approaches? 
Yet the revelation that the sentencing decision process does not conform 
to the deductive, legal-analytical image seems to be a source of a degree of 
disappointment to some writers. It is considered to be an ideal towards which 
judges ought to strive. For example, observing that the Victorian Full Court 
‘reaffirmed the instinctive synthesis’ view of sentencing, Fox argues that 
further ‘disse~t ion’~~ of cases by judges ‘explaining’ their sentencing decision 
process is welcomed as ‘ . . . being more informative about the manner in 
which they reach their decisions. Such openness can only benefit the 
jurisprudence and psychology of judicial ~entencing.’’~ 
The implication here is that the public declaration of reasoning openly 
explains the decision process and that an intuitive account of sentencing 
simply does not provide an adequate explanation of the process.s0 On the 
contrary, I would suggest that an intuitive account may in fact provide us 
with a more transparent understanding of the kind of process of sentencing 
based on ‘typical whole case stories’ which become so routinized that they 
become obvious and common-sensical to the sentencer. This intuitive under- 
standing may be difficult for the sentencer to articulate simply because 
normally she  is not expected to  provide it.81 However, we should not assume 
that because sentencers tell us that sentencing does not rely on linear, deduc- 
tive logic (that it is ‘intuitive’, ‘comes from experience’; ‘a hunch’, and so 
on) that it is unpatterned, arbitrary or impossible to understand. 
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As we saw above, the revelation that the sentencing decision process may 
not begin with consideration of the legal conviction neatly followed by 
consideration of ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’ seems to be greeted 
with some disappointment. However, such disappointment may not be 
confined to the study of sentencing, but to legal decision-making more 
generally. For example, in their study of problem-solving in civil law cases, 
Crombag et al. attempted to elicit accounts from experienced legal problem- 
solvers.82 They concluded that: 
While skilled problem-solvers may not be able to tell us explicitly how they proceeded 
while solving a problem, they are able to complete the solving itself. . . . The most striking 
result was that what was said while thinking aloud created a rather chaotic unsystematic 
impression. Often a person seemed to have a solution, although a provisional one, at 
an early stage, for which he subsequently tried to find supporting arguments. 
Crombag et al. argue that skilled legal problem solvers are like other skilled 
problem-solvers in that they tend to have a provisional solution in place 
early and to work backwards. Curiously, however, they describe these results 
as ‘disappointing’.s3 Had they, perhaps, hoped that their experienced legal 
problem-solvers might demonstrate a process of reasoning on the basis of 
legal analysis characterised by the supposed virtues of linear, deductive 
thought derived from first principles? 
While it may be true that skilled problem-solvers (like lawyers) come to 
an early provisional solution and then try to find supporting arguments, can 
this finding be extended to judges? I would suggest that the nature of the 
sentencing decision process may not be very qualitatively distinct from the 
nature of the discretionary legal decision process more generally.84 The 
background of most judges in most adversarial law jurisdictions is one which 
results from years of experience as a successful advocate/solicitor. The nature 
of the adversarial process (as opposed to the inquisitorial one) is to represent 
one’s client and achieve a favourable result rather than to find the ‘truth’ 
in any objective sense.*’ The craft of lawyering demands working towards 
a final goal and locating and interpreting previous decisions which will 
promote that goal. In this regard, the character of the sentencing decision 
process may be little different from that performed by other makers of 
discretionary legal decisions. It may be reasonable to suppose that after so 
many years experience of lawyering this purposive approach may continue 
to be useful (albeit semi-consciously) to the lawyer who has been promoted 
(often part-time) to the bench. After all, few, if any, common law jurisdic- 
tions encourage or require judges to begin the sentencing process from any 
grounded process. Rather, judges are encouraged to base their decisions 
largely on experience. As Ashworth et al. observe from their interviews with 
judges about sentencing: ‘Most judges described it as an instinctive process, 
using such terms as “instinct”, “experience”, “hunch” and “feeling”.’86 Thus, 
the giving of reasons for sentence may well be more to do with a publicly 
defensible and legally legitimate reconstruction of the process than revealing 
the full flow of consciousness in the decision process.87 
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In a comparative review of sentencing research, Albrecht states that ‘[tlhe 
core problem in research on sentencing is still embedded in the question of 
which variables determine decision making within the criminal courts and 
which criteria actually account for variation in sentencing decision 
outcomes.’88 There appears to be an assumption that sentencing can best (or 
only) be explained by abstracting individual ‘pieces’ of information from 
their case-context and analysing them as if they possessed some independent, 
discrete power. I would suggest that some traditional representations of the 
sentencing decision process employed by some systems of numerical guide- 
lines, artificial intelligence, and some studies of disparity fail to capture the 
essentially holistic nature of the decision process preferring instead to assume 
that the decision process is so highly complicated that it can only be under- 
stood through expert linear, legal, and mathematical analytical models. 
The result is that decision-makers (in this case judges) tend to feel alienated 
by the analytical complexity of the model and yet, despite its complexity, 
feel that the model is missing something essential. That essential, but missing 
quality lies in the dynamic but fluid interaction of the abstracted ‘factors’. 
Analytical models fail to capture the importance of ‘the whole case’ about 
which judges so often speak. Information which analytical models extract 
from a case only has meaning to the purposive decision-maker in relation 
to the whole offence story. Rather than artificially analysing case informa- 
tion, a typology could be developed to reflect kinds of offence stories from 
the perspective of sentencing rather than legal conviction. A case story would 
not be analysed as a collection or combination of fragmented ‘factors’, but 
a reintegrated whole. 
Thus far, discussion in this article has focused on the idea of approaching 
an understanding of the sentencing decision process in terms of typical 
offence stories. I will now turn to the place of offender information and its 
relationship with the idea of ‘typical whole offence stories’. 
5 .  ‘Offence’ and ‘offender’ characteristics 
Both academic writing and sentencing reforms have tended to assume that 
sentencing either begins, or, should begin, with consideration of the offence, 
then orientate a sentence which is then adjusted in the light of the nature 
of the offender. For example, in his discussion of sentencing in Victoria, 
Fox documents the failure of attempts to establish a ‘two-stage’ sentencing 
procedure whereby sentencers first consider the offence and then the 
offender.89 He seems to lament the refusal of the Victoria Full Supreme 
Court to sanction such a two-stage procedure. That Court noted that the 
High Court expressly rejected the suggestion that a two-stage approach, 
opting instead, ‘ . . . for a global sanction taking into account the circum- 
stances of the offending in their entirety.’q0 In their text on sentencing prac- 
tice in Northern Ireland, Boyle and Allen also assume that the decision 
process begins with a general orientation towards punishment for the offence 
followed by consideration of individual offender characteristics: 
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. . . the sentencer, having chosen the sentence range appropriate to the offence will next 
consider whether the sentence appropriate to the gravity of the offence should be reduce 
to reflect the presence of mitigating factors . . . found to exist in the character and past 
history of the offender . . 
Writing about sentencing in the then West Germany, Weigend remarks that: 
Legal scholars argue that consideration of the appropriate sentence should consist of at 
least two stages: first, setting the sentence that reflects the offender’s culpability; second, 
correcting it for his rehabilitative needs: and possibly further adjusting it  to satisfy the 
demands of general deterrence. It is not likely that [sentencing] panels actually undertake 
these complicated mental  operation^.^^ 
(a) Reform and ‘the offence’ and ‘the offender’ 
The judged seriousness of a ‘typical whole offence story’ is itself informed 
and determined by the nature of the offender and hisher relationship with 
the victim, and likewise the offender’s nature is informed and determined 
by the offence story. In his research into the flow of criminal cases and the 
nature of court organisational culture, Feeley observes that, ‘ . . . for a 
charge to assume meaning it must be given substantive content by a descrip- 
tion of the incident and information about the defendant’s character, habits 
and rn~t iva t ion . ’~~ Sentencers must necessarily make judgements about the 
moral responsibility of ‘the offender’ if they are to understand and interpret 
the seriousness of ‘the offence’ before them. Indeed, section 29 of the 1991 
Criminal Justice Act of England and Wales may arguably have been so 
unpopular with ~en tence r s~~  at least in part, because it tried, (or, at least as 
it appeared to judges and others), to structure sentencing, according to an 
artificial distinction between offence and offender ‘factors’. 
This may also partly explain the judicial resistance which the United States 
federal sentencing guidelines have encountered. The system of guidelines is 
operated by a grid which attempts to divorce ‘offence’ and ‘offender’ infor- 
mation from each other. The attempt by the federal guidelines to abstract 
issues concerning the ‘offence’ and those concerning ‘the offender’ from the 
whole case is not one that judges feel comfortable with, because ‘[blefore the 
guidelines, judges often considered offender characteristics reflecting blame- 
worthiness . . . ’95 However, it seems probable that judges still do consider 
what are labelled ‘offender’ characteristics in order to determine blamewor- 
thiness (what is labelled the ‘offence’) despite the instructions of the guide- 
lines. Perhaps it is the attempt to force sentencers to implement a practical 
(rather than a notional) divorce between the so-called ‘offence’ and ‘offender’ 
characteristics from each other that has led to the deep unpopularity of the 
United States federal guidelines and their widespread 
Tonry rightly criticizes the ‘two-dimensionality’ sentencing guideline grids 
which are based on a two axis grid ‘machine’: 
Reduced to their core elements all, all sentencing guidelines grids are fundamentally the 
same: two dimensional tables that classify crimes by their severity along one axis and 
criminal records by their extent along another . . . Judges and prosecutors and other 
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officials make decisions about whole people, and not about generic offenders who have 
committed X and have a criminal history Y . . . Judges and lawyers . . . resist the refection 
of individuals into crime and criminal history amalgams.g7 
Tonry’s criticism of the mathematical, algebraic formula of X offence score 
plus Y offence score determining the sentence is a valid one. ‘Offence’ and 
‘offender’ information do not work discretely in the sentencing decision 
process: the interpretation of one is integral to the other. For example, the 
‘situation’ of the offender and hisher relationship with the victim, the offend- 
er’s criminal, medical, social, psychological history all inevitably confer 
meaning on the offence story and on questions of harm and culpability. 
However, Tonry’s assertion that judges (especially trial judges) are reluc- 
tant to treat ‘ . . . people as stereotypes rather than individuals’ seems a little 
s~ rp r i s ing .~~  As was argued above, the criminal process produces normalized, 
and typified cases. There may be a variety of types of cases which appear 
before sentencers and which are (re)constructed by sentencing process itself, 
but they are not infinitely unique in the way that individual persons are infi- 
nitely unique as Tonry appears to imply. In thinking about the relationship 
between ‘the offence’ and ‘the offender’, information needs to be re-thought 
in terms of types of whole case stories rather than in terms of unique individ- 
uals. Sentencers do not make decisions about completely unique whole 
individual persons, but as examples of types of whole case stories. 
(b) Philosophical theories of punishment and ‘the offence and the 
What might this mean for normative theories of punishment such as 
‘desert?’ Although essentially ‘offence’-based, attempts to implement 
‘desert’ have had to allow the inclusion of what the theory labels as ‘offender’ 
characteristics where ‘relevant’ to the offence. The practical difficulty in 
implementing ‘desert’ theory has been in where the line should be drawn 
between the relevance and non-relevance of so-called offender information 
to the issues of harm and culpability (which desert regards as primarily 
properties of ‘the offence’). Arguably, this illustrates the difficulty in making 
and implementing a practical distinction between the ‘offence’ and the 
‘offender’ when the decision of the sentencer requires one single overall 
outcome in response to the judged seriousness of the whole story of the case. 
The sentencer cannot in practice make a discrete decision about the ‘offence’ 
and then a discrete decision about the ‘offender’, but rather must reach one 
decision outcome. 
Tonry holds the implementation of desert in part responsible for the failure 
of the United States federal guidelines.lW He criticizes desert for ignoring 
the differences between offenders, but to do so is to criticize the quintessence 
of desert.Io1 The problem for desert is that it attempts to abstract issues of 
harm and culpability from the whole case story, and that necessarily 
incorporates a judgement about the offender’s situation and character. 
offender’ 
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Parallel problems may be identified in other philosophical justifications for 
how and why punishment is practised. For example, rehabilitative and 
treatment models inevitably necessitate a relative judgement about the moral 
responsibility and ‘appropriateness’ of the offender’s behaviour in order to 
interpret the seriousness of the whole case. Therefore, I would suggest that 
as an interpretative category for research into the sentencing decision 
process, philosophical justifications of punishment fail to illuminate the 
practice of that process. Rather, the role of philosophical justifications of 
punishment may lie more specifically in their ability to provide symbolically 
defensible normative accounts of how or why societies punish.Io2 This is not 
to deny the importance of philosophical accounts, but rather to suggest that 
their explanatory value may lie at the heart of cultural questions.Io3 
6 .  ‘Typical whole case stories’ 
I have argued for a re-appraisal of traditional approaches to conceptualizing 
and representing and advocated consideration of an alternative approach 
based on typical whole case stories. How might such an alternative re-presen- 
tation of cases look? The key feature would be the radical reintegration of 
‘offence and offender’ and the abandonment of supposedly universal, inde- 
pendent ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’: information abstracted from 
their case context with supposedly discrete and universal power over the 
decision outcome. Since ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’ are only mean- 
ingful in the context of their case story; types of whole case stories could be 
represented. Such a taxonomy would reintegrate offence and offender 
features. One hypothetical example might look as follows : 
This is a case about a young man who has recently broken up with his girlfriend (and 
now has limited contact with his one-year-old daughter). He has since become 
increasingly drug-dependent and committed robbery using a knife against a chemist. 
Until being remanded in custody, he had, over a relatively short period of time, been 
robbing a relatively small quantity of class 7 drug (known locally as ‘0) from chemists 
in areas A, B of the city. He would then sell some of it  on to similar-aged acquaintances 
and consume the rest himself. 
This may arguably be a fairly typical kind of case story upon which 
sentencers decide in Scotland. This is not to say that many individuals are 
exactly as described, but rather that patterns of typified whole case stories 
emerge from the criminal process. The patterns may differ through time and 
space. However, the stories which need to be developed would involve the 
natural, holistic narration of what is called ‘offence’ and ‘offender’ informa- 
tion. ‘Knowing’ that the offender is ‘drug-dependent’, that it was ‘O’, that 
he sold it on to acquaintances rather than younger people at ‘raves’, that 
he kept some for himself tells the sentencer something about the motivation 
and of the offender’s behaviour. Armed with this ‘knowledge’, the sentencer 
is able to interpret both the character and behaviour of the offender because 
the one ‘explains’ the other. This is distinct from an attempt to abstract 
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individual pieces of ‘information’ from their whole case context and imply 
that they have some independent influence on the decision process. 
As judges continually emphasize, each case is unique at least in some 
sense. So while the ‘plot’ of different kinds of case stories may closely follow 
typical patterns, the precise detail concerning each case means that each case 
may vary slightly from the basic, normal storyIW (and just different enough 
to fulfil the judicial rhetoric that ‘justice dictates each case must be judged 
on its own merits’). However, the effective disposal of ‘streams of cases’l05 
depends on the ability of the criminal process to communicate expectations 
and cues which guide judges in answering the question ‘what type of case 
is this? 
It may be that by attempting to develop and implement a research typolo- 
gy based on judicial images of typical whole case stories, the question of 
‘disparity’ needs to be re-examined. Yet to what extent could we expect 
judges to share similar images of typical whole case stories? After all, judges 
frequently work in isolation and share little systematic information about 
sentencing.lM On that basis it might be expected that individual sentencers 
would vary markedly in line with their individual conceptions of typical 
whole case stories. Indeed, it seems possible to identify one tradition within 
sentencing research, particularly popular in North America, which posits 
that an individual judge’s ‘philosophy’ of punishment and how this fits into 
hidher individual ideological socio-political world-view is one (or even the) 
main determinant of sentencing decisions.IO7 However, if it is true that whole 
case stories are largely constructed and typified by the criminal process 
before they even reach the judge, then it is also true that the agenda for 
judicial sentencing is in practice largely circumscribed by the construction, 
cues, and expectations of earlier and later points in the criminal process. 
This is not to suggest that judicial sentencing is completely reactive or 
passive, but rather to emphasize that sociolegal research has shown that 
official, formal discretion is regulated and patterned by social rules.I0* 
Indeed, this might explain why we may discover a surprisingly high degree 
of broad agreement in the development of a research tool based on typical 
whole case stories.Iw 
In the introduction to this paper I noted that some writers have observed 
the limited ability of research to explain sentencing behaviour.Il0 As 
Gottfredson has remarked, ‘it would be difficult to find other decision prob- 
lems affecting critically the liberty and futures and lives of large numbers 
of people in which decisions are made with so little knowledge of the way 
in which they are made.’IIl No doubt this has been obstructed by judicial 
sensitivity to researchers gaining and maintaining access to research.Il2 
However, there may be some conventional assumptions made by research 
which themselves cause sentencers discomfort. These centre around a legal- 
analytical paradigm of decision-making which may ask sentencers to outline 
their ‘philosophy’ of punishment and how this determines their practices, or 
what ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’, they consider most important and 
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why, or, what weight that give to ‘offence’ as opposed to ‘offender factors’ 
and so on. While judicial accounts in court are often couched in terms of 
analytical ‘legal and philosophical principles’, I have attempted to argue that 
the sentencing decision is in fact a far more intuitive and socially constructed 
practice than legal rhetoric implies. 
CONCLUSION 
The attempts to ‘describe’ and ‘explain’ the sentencing decision process 
necessarily implies the same questions concerning the comparison of similar 
cases. I have argued that the conception and representation of similarity has 
been dominated by legalistic starting points which may in fact be of little 
help in representing similarity meaningfully from the perspective of the 
sentencing decision as a process. The question of the similarity of cases with 
more than one conviction has received perhaps less attention than it might. 
A legal-analytical approach in which a ‘most serious’ offence is moderated 
by further ‘factors’ is artificial. 
An alternative approach is informed by research in discretionary decision- 
making in other parts of the criminal process to try to develop an under- 
standing and representation of ‘typical whole case stories’. I have suggested 
that the decision process of judges may not be very different in character to 
that of other discretionary decision-makers and that such research should 
not be discounted in thinking about judicial discretion. Indeed, judges’ 
professional background may lead us to suppose that they approach the 
decision process purposefully and pragmatically rather than in a formal, 
linear fashion. The public giving of reasons as justification for decisions 
(often clothed in the analytical language of philosophical justifications of 
punishment) should not be taken as a full, comprehensive or transparent 
account of the decision process. Further, the search for ‘aggravating 
and mitigating factors’ and dichotomous representation of cases in ‘offence’ 
and ‘offender’ information suggests an artificially deductive and analytical 
account of the decision process. 
This article has attempted to suggest an alternative way in which we might 
better understand and represent the sentencing decision process. However, 
it has not attempted to normatively evaluate different philosophical justi- 
fications of punishment (that is, for what ‘reason’, if at  all, we ought to 
punish).Il3 I have tried to suggest that these questions have not and cannot 
empirically explain the decision process in practice. Rather, philosophical 
justifications provide a vital powerful symbolic function in the cultural 
debate about punishment. 
However, at least two (no doubt more) theoretical questions seem to 
remain. The first relates to the possibility of adapting the typical whole case 
stories approach to areas beyond the sentencing decision. The second relates 
to accountability in sentencing (and discretion) through the symbol of legal- 
philosophical rhetoric. I will address each of these briefly. 
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1. Discretionary (legal)? decision making 
This article has argued that the implications of research into the exercise of 
discretion in other areas of the criminal process should be considered in 
thinking about how we understand and research the sentencing decision’ 
process. Equally, the use of typical whole case stories may have implications 
for other areas of discretionary legal decision making and the use of discre- 
tion in non-legal settings. Is there anything distinctive about the decision 
process outwith primarily legal institutions? How closely does the character 
of the sentencing decision process closely relate to other areas of discre- 
tiona,ry decision-making - for example, the process of grading a student 
assignment? If the character of the decision process between discretionary 
decision-making in this area and that of sentencing is not qu,alitatively 
distinct should we be talking of discretionary ‘legal’ decision-making at all? 
Would it be more useful to think simply of discretionary decision-making? 
2. Public accountability and symbolic justification 
Perhaps the attempt to construct legal-analytical models of the decision 
process may in part be influenced by symbolic public declarations of the 
courts themselves. The giving of publicly declared reasons for a decision 
tend to be couched in legal analytical terms. Has this more to do with the 
necessity to fulfil a popularly-held expectation of the ‘principles’ of justice 
than a revelation of the stream of consciousness in the decision process? ‘If 
[official] reasons [for decisions] have a place in court, it is because they are 
defensible, not because they are true.’II4 It may be that the official nature 
of sentencing reform through official sentencing commissions and councils 
could itself lead to a reluctance to depart from officially-sanctioned and 
accepted ‘explanatory’ categories of the sentencing process (for example, 
‘desert’, ‘aggravating and mitigating factors’, ‘offender characteristics’, and 
so on). To depart from these categories in a public way may invite accusa- 
tions that sentencing is officially recognized to lack the symbolically ‘law- 
like’ features of linear, deductive, analytical legal reasoning and thus be 
admitted to be without ‘order’. An official body of reform, as found for 
example in sentencing commissions and councils, may feel bound to employ 
these rhetorical explanatory categories in order to support the symbolic idea 
of the juridical character of the decision process. 
Thus, the official, public style of these reforms may provide legitimation 
and one kind of ‘accountability’, but in fact these accounts tell us little about 
the actual sentencing decision process itself and more about the demands 
of legal rhetoric. However, this is not say that legal rhetoric is unimportant 
or should be ignored, but merely that we should recognize that it has a 
symbolic role of legitimation rather than an instrumental role. It may be 
that the symbolic role tell us more about law as communication. As Wilkins 
has observed, “plerhaps our main problem is that we have not been honest 
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in our language in discussing criminal justice procedures. We have tried to 
believe that our sanctions were rational when they were mainly symbol i~ . ’~I~  
For reform the dilemma is that to admit the symbolism (rather than instru- 
mentalism) of sanctions may risk undermining the power of the idea of law. 
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